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he  most  significant  effect  of  the  Cypriot  crisis  is  that  the  rules  governing  the 
resolution of future banking crises in the eurozone have been rewritten. According to 
the new bail-in doctrine imposed by Germany and the IMF, future bailout operations 
will involve deposit holders. Those who hold deposits of more than €100,000 now know that 
if their country gets into financial trouble and has to ask for support from other eurozone 
countries, they are likely to lose part or all of their savings. The Dutch Minister of Finance, 
Jeroen Dijsselbloem, was honest in admitting that this would be the new “template” for the 
future. His retraction afterwards alters nothing about this observation.  
The  new  template  guiding  the  resolution  of  future  financial  crises  will  have  negative 
consequences, on two counts.   
First, it increases the systemic risk in the eurozone and makes future bank crises more likely. 
It is not hard to see why. Every time the fear arises in a country that the government or  
banks may be involved in a bailout, a bank run will occur because depositors will want to 
prevent the loss of their savings by withdrawing them from the bank. This in itself will lead 
to more bank runs and will further weaken an already fragile system.  
It  is  important  to  stress  here  that  these  runs  will  occur  regardless  of  whether  financial 
difficulties beset the banks or the national government. In the absence of a banking union, 
the fate of both sovereign and local banks in the eurozone is linked in a ‘deadly embrace’. 
When the sovereign fails it pulls down the banks, and vice versa. Thus, if the fear exists that 
a member country government is going to need financial support, it will now translate into a 
fear for the banks in that country, thereby making bank runs more likely.  
Second, the new template will impose large economic costs on countries subjected to the 
bail-in treatment. The banking system is highly interconnected. When one bank fails, it pulls 
others into insolvency, including the solvent ones. Banks are central to the payment and 
credit system and thus add another layer of interconnection: the one between businesses 
using the same payment system. As a result, when banks fail they can drag large parts of the 
private  business  sector  into  bankruptcy.  This  happened  in  the  1930s  and  made  the 
depression so severe. It will also happen in Cyprus now.  
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Those who devised the new bail-in template ignored the consequences of this template when 
it applies to banks. They appear to be labouring under the illusion that deposits are just like 
any other investment, and that holders can be made to pay in the same way as the holder of 
a bond or a collateralised debt obligation (CDO) can be made to pay when the issuer of these 
assets runs into trouble. But because bank deposits form the very core of the payment and 
credit mechanism, when the value of these deposits is undermined by seizure, the payment 
and credit mechanism grinds to a halt and so does the economy. Economic history is there to 
testify to the power of that effect. 
Several arguments have been used in support of the new bail-in template. The first is that it 
is necessary to protect taxpayers. The problem with this argument is that it fails to perform a 
correct cost-benefit analysis. If the taxpayer is spared, this will indeed create a benefit. But 
forcing deposit holders to take the hit risks creating banking crises that will result in deep 
economic depression. These will typically lead to much larger costs for the same taxpayers.  
In  fact,  those  who  forced  the  new  bail-in  template  were  primarily  concerned  about  the 
German  taxpayer,  not  those  in  Cyprus  today  and  in  other  countries  in  the  future.  These 
taxpayers will pay the full price of economic depressions that follow the collapse of banks. 
But this is of no concern to the German taxpayer.  
A second argument often heard to rationalise the bail-in of deposit holders is that it will 
make the latter more aware of the risks they incur by holding their deposits in a particular 
bank.  This  again  is  considering  deposit  holding  as  an  investment  like  any  other. In  fact, 
holding deposits is necessary for business; it is not an investment choice. When deposits are 
wiped out, large segments of private business are also wiped out, creating huge collateral 
damage. The risk in banking should be reduced by other means, e.g. by imposing much 
higher capital ratios, or by separating investment from commercial banking, not by raising 
the spectre that deposit holders will lose their shirts in future crises.  
One may object here that while the holdings of demand deposits are indeed not primarily 
the result of an investment choice and are related to economic transactions, this does not 
necessarily apply in the case of time deposits. The latter come much closer to being part of an 
investment  portfolio.  This  then  leads  to  the  well-recognised  problem  that  banks  may  be 
induced by the existence of a deposit guarantee to attract deposits promising high interest 
rates. This in turn gives banks an incentive to invest in high-return and high-risk projects. 
Given the guarantee on their deposits, the holders of these deposits have no incentive to 
monitor the behaviour of bankers.  
This is a serious problem but it should be solved by regulatory means. Thus, in order to 
avoid banks competing for time deposits by paying out high interest rates, regulators could 
force banks to increase their capital ratios when the interest rates they pay on time deposits 
exceed a certain benchmark. Alternatively, a cap on these interest rates could be imposed. In 
fact, such caps were in place in many countries before the great deregulation movement of 
the  1970s  and  1980s.  There  is  no  reason  why  they  could  not  be  reintroduced.  After  all, 
governments have to intervene in the price setting when the latter creates externalities. In 
this case paying high interest rates on deposits creates risks for the system as a whole, i.e. 
risks outside the bank that sets interest rates too high.  
A third argument used to justify the new bail-in template is that this is how bank resolutions 
are organised in the US, and quite successfully so. Indeed, when a bank fails, the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) will typically close the bank and bail in uninsured 
depositors. Generally, this does not lead to a run in other banks. This is true but these bail-in 
operations generally only involve small banks. During the banking crisis of 2008, the US 
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of Lehman Brothers, with disastrous consequences). Moreover, US banks are embedded in a 
banking union. As a result, the failings of local banks do not affect the local government as 
the cost of the resolution is spread over the whole population of US taxpayers.   
Why w  as this dangerous new bail-in doctrine imposed in Cyprus? The main reason is that 
creditor nations in the eurozone do not want to pay for rescue operations involving banks of 
debtor  countries.  The  prevailing  view  in  the  creditor  countries  (based  on  moral  hazard 
thinking)  is  that  the  debtor  nations are  fully  responsible  for  their  own  predicament,  and 
therefore  it  would  be  wholly  inappropriate  for  their  taxpayers  to  support  them.  Using 
taxpayers’ money from creditor nations would just invite further recklessness.  
The truth is that the responsibility for the euro crisis is shared. For every reckless debtor 
there was a reckless creditor. The northern countries were all too ready to provide loans to 
southerners so as to be able to accumulate export surpluses. The northern countries’ banks 
involved  in  these  lending  operations managed  to  shift  the  loan  losses  to  their  respective 
governments. None was subjected to the bail-ins that will now be imposed on the debtor 
countries.  
The recognition that responsibilities for this crisis are shared would go a long way to making 
it acceptable for the costs of the adjustment to be shared among taxpayers in the north and 
south  of  the  eurozone.  The  failure  to  recognise  shared  responsibility  has  led  to  the 
imposition  of  a  bail-in  template  that  increases  the  risk  of  banking  crises  and  economic 
depression in the eurozone.  
When  a  banking  crisis  erupts,  authorities  have to  weigh  up  two  risks.  One  is  the moral 
hazard  risk  that  will  emerge  in  the  future  when  a  bank  is  bailed  out.  The  other  is  the 
immediate  risk  of  an  implosion  of  the  banking  system  when  a  bail-in  is  implemented. 
Governments that have the power to do so will almost always opt for the bailout option 
when systemic banks are involved in order to avoid immediate costs to the economy, i.e. a 
deep economic depression. When sovereign governments have to choose between two evils 
in  times  of  crisis,  i.e.  a  future  moral  hazard  risk  or  the  immediate  risk  of  an  economic 
depression, they will choose the former in order to avoid the latter. It is therefore naïve to 
think that the governments of northern Europe that now impose bail-ins on the south will 
apply these on their own banks in a future banking crisis.  
The conclusion above implies that in order to reduce the moral hazard risk, the regulation of 
banks should go much further than what has been achieved today. The imposition of tighter 
regulation – including much higher capital ratios, a separation of investment banking and 
commercial banking, and caps on time-deposit interest rates – is a better approach than the 
bail-in option, which will have enormous economic consequences for the countries of the 
eurozone that have transferred much of their sovereignty to the creditor nations in the north 
of the eurozone. 
 
 
   